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Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial? 
Professor Kent McNeil
*
 
Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto 
Presented at the Law on the Edge Conference, Canadian Law and Society 
Association/Law and Society Association of Australia and New Zealand, 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, July 1-4, 2013 
 
This paper addresses the issue of Aboriginal title to land, and the relationship I 
see between Indigenous law and the common law in this context.  In my 
understanding, there have been three judicial approaches to Aboriginal title: 
1. A purely proprietary approach, based on occupation of land and the effect 
given to occupation by the common law (common law Aboriginal title). 
2. An Indigenous law approach, whereby Aboriginal title arises from and is 
defined by pre-existing Indigenous law (Indigenous law title). 
3. A territorial approach, whereby Aboriginal title is derived from both common 
law and Indigenous law and has governmental dimensions (territorial Aboriginal 
title).
1
 
I am going to describe each of these, and then offer some critical comments on 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard2 and 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s more recent decision in William v. 
British Columbia (the Tsilhqot'in Nation case).
3
 
1.  Common Law Aboriginal Title 
 
It is an obvious historical fact that Indigenous peoples were living in North 
America, and occupying and using land in accordance with their own ways of 
                                                          
*
 In addition to the very helpful feedback received from fellow panelists and the other 
participants at the Law on the Edge Conference, I would like to thank Kerry Wilkins for his 
very useful comments. 
1
 Brian Slattery, in “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255 
[Slattery, “Metamorphosis”], has identified three similar conceptions of Aboriginal title.  
However, he describes the third, which he supports, as “a sui generis right grounded in 
ancient relations between the Crown and Indigenous peoples”: ibid. at 263, elaborated on at 
269-79.  
2
 [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard]. 
3
 [2012] 3 C.N.L.R. 333 [Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA]. 
2 
 
life, when the Europeans arrived and began to colonize the continent.  In the 
settled parts of Canada first colonized by the British, the settlers brought the 
common law with them.
4
 
Under the common law, people who are in occupation of land are presumed to 
have possession and thus title to the land they occupy.
5
  So Indigenous peoples 
would have title under the common law to the lands they occupied at the time of 
the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty.6  This common law Aboriginal title neither 
depends on, nor is defined by, Indigenous law.  It is a wholly common law 
concept.  Moreover, it is purely proprietary – it does not necessarily entail 
governmental authority or political jurisdiction. 
I would characterize the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to Aboriginal title 
in Marshall/Bernard and the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s approach in 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation case as a proprietary, common law approach.  I will come 
back to those decisions later. 
2.  Indigenous Law Title 
In addition to occupying and using land, the Indigenous peoples of Canada had 
their own legal orders at the time of European colonization.
7
  These legal orders 
included laws in relation to land.
8
 
                                                          
4
 Connolly v. Woolrich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 (Que. S.C.), aff’d sub nom. Johnstone v. 
Connolly (1969), 17 R.J.R.Q. 266 (Que. Q.B.).  
5
 Calder v. British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 per Hall J. (dissenting on other grounds) at 
368, 375 [Calder]. 
6
 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 at paras. 114, 149, per Lamer C.J. 
[Delgamuukw]; Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1989), esp. at 196-221 [McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title].  Crown assertion of 
sovereignty also raises issues of legality and legitimacy that I have addressed elsewhere: see 
Kent McNeil, “Negotiated Sovereignty: Indian Treaties and the Acquisition of American and 
Canadian Territorial Rights in the Pacific Northwest”, in Alexandra Harmon, ed., The Power 
of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2008), 35, and  “Indigenous Nations and the Legal Relativity of European 
Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in North America”, in Sandra Tomsons and Lorraine 
Mayer, eds., Philosophy and Aboriginal Rights: Critical Dialogues (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 242.  
7
 See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2010). 
8
 E.g. see Leroy Little Bear, “Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian ‘Grundnorm’”, in J. Rick 
Ponting, ed., Arduous Journey: Canadian Indians and Decolonization (Toronto: McClelland 
& Stewart, 1986), 243; Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Report of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: 
3 
 
At the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, those laws and the 
land rights of the Indigenous peoples under those laws would have continued by 
virtue of the doctrine of continuity.
9
  This doctrine has been applied in Canada to 
the land rights of the French Canadians when Britain acquired New France from 
the French king in 1763.
10
 
The doctrine of continuity has also been adopted and applied in the context of 
the land rights of the Indigenous peoples of Australia by the High Court, initially 
in Mabo v. Queensland
11
 in 1992.  As a result, in Australia the source of native 
title (as Aboriginal title is called there) is the pre-existing laws and customs of 
the Indigenous peoples.  Moreover, native title in Australia also receives its 
content and is defined by Indigenous laws and customs.
12
  This sounds positive 
for Indigenous Australians because their laws are acknowledged and given 
effect.  However, this approach has serious downsides.
13
 
First of all, in order to have their land rights acknowledged by the Australian 
legal system, Indigenous Australians have to do more than prove that they 
occupied and used land at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty.  In 
addition, they also have to establish that they had laws or customs in relation to 
the land that gave them legal rights at that time.  As this involves proof of the 
legal orders of non-literate societies over 200 years ago (in eastern Australia), 
the problems of proof can be formidable. 
                                                                                                                                                               
Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996), pt. 2, 434-64; Richard Overstall, 
“Encountering the Spirit in the Land: ‘Property’ in a Kinship-Based Legal Order”, in John 
McLaren, A.R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in 
British Settler Societies (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 22. 
9
 See Brian Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University 
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979), 50-59; Mark D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ 
of Continuity: Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” 
(1999) 44 McGill L.J. 711; Kent McNeil and David Yarrow, “Has Constitutional Recognition 
of Aboriginal Rights Adversely Affected Their Definition?” (2007) 37 Supreme Court L. 
Rev. (2
nd
) 177 at 203-11. 
10
 See Drulard v. Welsh (1906), 11 O.L.R. 647 (Ont. Div. Ct.), rev’d on other grounds (1907), 
14 O.L.R. 54 (Ont. C.A.).  Admittedly, New France is regarded as having been acquired by 
Britain by conquest and cession rather than by settlement, but the High Court of Australia, in 
the cases cited in the next two notes, has held that the doctrine of continuity applies in settled 
territories as well.  See also McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 179-92. 
11
 (1992), 175 CLR 1. 
12
 See Fejo v. Northern Territory (1998), 195 C.L.R. 96; Western Australia v. Ward (2002), 
213 C.L.R. 1 [Ward]; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v. Victoria (2002), 
214 C.L.R. 422 [Yorta Yorta]. 
13
 See Simon Young, The Trouble with Tradition: Native Title and Cultural Change (Sydney: 
Federation Press, 2008). 
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Secondly, in Australia native title rights are limited to pre-existing rights.  So if 
at the time of Crown acquisition of sovereignty an Indigenous people did not 
have laws or customs in relation to minerals, for example, they are not entitled to 
mineral rights on their native title lands.
14
  The content of their land rights is thus 
frozen in the past at a time when they lived as hunters and gatherers. 
Thirdly, under Australian law the Indigenous peoples have no inherent right of 
self-government.  While some modification of their pre-existing land rights is 
possible, they have no inherent jurisdiction to make new laws in relation to land 
or anything else.
15
 
Fourthly, the High Court has held that loss of connection with the land and 
significant gaps in the practice of Indigenous laws and customs result in loss of 
native title.
16
  This is so even if the loss of connection was caused by forcible 
dispossession by the colonizers.
17
 
So far, Indigenous law has not been applied by Canadian courts in the way it has 
been in Australia.  Justice McLachlin, as she then was, suggested in her dissent 
in R. v. Van der Peet
18
 that it would be appropriate to base Aboriginal rights and 
title at least in part on pre-existing Indigenous law,
19
 but her decision as Chief 
Justice in Marshall/Bernard is anything but an Indigenous law approach. 
3.  Territorial Aboriginal Title 
Under this approach, Indigenous land rights are not limited to property rights, as 
they are under the first two approaches. Instead, Indigenous peoples have 
governmental authority (i.e., political jurisdiction) over the territories occupied 
by them at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty, in addition to rights to the 
                                                          
14
 Ward, supra note 12. 
15
 Yorta Yorta, supra note 12. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at paras. 261-75 [Van der Peet]. 
19
 See also Mitchell v. MNR, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 [Mitchell], per McLachlin C.J., delivering 
the main judgment (Binnie and Major JJ. concurred in result), at para. 10: “aboriginal 
interests and customary laws were presumed to survive the assertion of sovereignty, and were 
absorbed into the common law as rights, unless (1) they were incompatible with the Crown's 
assertion of sovereignty, (2) they were surrendered voluntarily via the treaty process, or (3) 
the government extinguished them….  Barring one of these exceptions, the practices, customs 
and traditions that defined the various aboriginal societies as distinctive cultures continued as 
part of the law of Canada: see Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 
313, and Mabo v. Queensland (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 at 57 (per Brennan J.), pp. 81-82 (per 
Deane and Gaudron JJ.), and pp. 182-83 (per Toohey J.).” 
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lands and resources within those territories.
20
  This is the approach that has been 
taken in the United States ever since the celebrated Cherokee Nation cases 
decided by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1830s.
21
 
In numerous cases before the Indian Claims Commission that went up on review 
to the Court of Claims, the issue was whether the land in question had been part 
of the territory that the claimant Indian nation occupied and controlled for a long 
time before it was wrongfully taken by the United States government.
22
  If it had 
been, then prior to the taking the Indian nation would have had both title to the 
land and jurisdiction over it, as held by Marshall C.J. in the Cherokee cases.
23
 
What about Canada?  Although the territorial title approach was not explicitly 
adopted in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
24
 (the leading Aboriginal title case 
in Canada), I think Chief Justice Lamer’s decision points undeniably in that 
direction.  He said that there are two potential sources of Aboriginal title: (1) 
occupation of land and the legal effect given to occupation by the common law – 
the common law Aboriginal title approach; and (2) Aboriginal systems of law – 
the Indigenous law approach.
25
 
But, as I read his judgment, he then combined the two into an approach based on 
occupation that incorporates both physical occupation and occupation through 
the application of Indigenous law: 
 
                                                          
20
 See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title to Land to Territorial 
Sovereignty” (1998) 5 Tulsa J. of Comp. and Int’l L. 253, reprinted in Kent McNeil, 
Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: 
University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 58 at 95-101 [McNeil, Emerging 
Justice?]. 
21
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832). 
22
 E.g. see Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 189 
(1963), cert. denied 375 U.S. 921 (1963); Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs 
Reservation of Oregon v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966); United States v. Seminole 
Indians, 180 Ct. Cl. 375 (1967); Sac and Fox Tribe v. United States, 383 F. 2d 991 (1967, Ct. 
Cl.), cert. denied 389 U.S. 900 (1967); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United 
States, 490 F. 2d 935 (1974, Ct. Cl.); United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F. 2d 1383 
(1975, Ct. Cl.).  For a very useful survey of relevant American case law, see Michael J. 
Kaplan, “Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands” (2003) 41 A.L.R. 
Fed. 425.  See also Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Nell Jessup Newton, ed. (New 
Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 2012), §15.04[2] [Cohen’s Handbook]. 
23
 See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 22, §15.04[2].   See also United States v. Santa Fe 
Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941). 
24
 Delgamuukw, supra note 6. 
25
 Ibid. at para. 114. 
6 
 
[T]he source of aboriginal title appears to be grounded both in the 
common law and in the aboriginal perspective on land; the latter 
includes, but is not limited to, their systems of law.  It follows that 
both should be taken into account in establishing the proof of 
occupancy.
26
 
 
Elaborating on Indigenous law as a means of proving occupation, Lamer 
C.J. continued: 
 
As a result, if, at the time of sovereignty, an aboriginal society had 
laws in relation to land, those laws would be relevant to 
establishing the occupation of lands which are the subject of a 
claim for aboriginal title.  Relevant laws might include, but are not 
limited to, a land tenure system or laws governing land use.
27
 
 
Other examples of relevant Indigenous laws are contained in this passage: 
 
[T]he aboriginal group asserting the claim to aboriginal title may 
have trespass laws which are proof of exclusive occupation, such 
that the presence of trespassers does not count as evidence against 
exclusivity.  As well, aboriginal laws under which permission may 
be granted to other aboriginal groups to use or reside even 
temporarily on land would reinforce the finding of exclusive 
occupation.  Indeed, if that permission were the subject of treaties 
between the aboriginal nations in question, those treaties would 
also form part of the aboriginal perspective.
28
 
Occupation through Indigenous law is a territorial approach: Indigenous peoples 
were in occupation of their traditional territories because they had laws, 
including laws in relation to land, that applied in those territories.  To put it 
another way, they were in occupation because they exercised governmental 
authority over their territories, in part through the application of their own laws.  
Lamer C.J. acknowledged this exercise of governmental authority not only by 
recognizing their capacity to make their own laws, but also by concluding that 
permission to use lands could be granted by treaty to other Aboriginal nations, as 
                                                          
26
 Ibid. at para. 147. 
27
 Ibid. at para. 148. 
28
 Ibid. at para. 157. 
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treaty-making authority is one of the attributes of independent, self-governing 
nations.
29
   
International law relies on the same criteria for acquiring title to territory (also 
known as territorial sovereignty), namely, physical occupation and exercise of 
governmental authority.
30
  International law therefore recognizes that the 
exercise of governmental authority over land is necessarily territorial.  In 
domestic contexts, this exercise of authority by Indigenous peoples supports 
continuing self-government power, whether regarded as residual sovereignty of 
the Indian nations, as in the United States,
31
 or as an inherent right of self-
government of First Nations, as held by Justice Williamson of the British 
Columbia Supreme Court in Campbell v. British Columbia.
32
 
So by acknowledging Indigenous law as a source of Aboriginal title and as a 
basis for proving occupation of land, Chief Justice Lamer’s approach to 
Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw was necessarily territorial.  His conception of 
Aboriginal title therefore entailed both property rights and political authority.
33
 
4.   Regressing to Common Law Aboriginal Title in Canada   
Surprisingly, in Marshall/Bernard Chief Justice McLachlin ignored the 
Indigenous law aspects, and hence the territorial dimensions, of Lamer C.J.’s 
decision in Delgamuukw.  She focused instead on physical occupation, and 
seems to have confined the role of Aboriginal perspectives to Aboriginal 
                                                          
29
 See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, 8th ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 369-71; Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6
th
 ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 198, 902-4. 
30
 Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 2 R.I.A.A. 829; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case, 
(1933) 2 P.C.I.J., Series A/B, No. 43; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, 1953 I.C.J.R. 47.  See 
Crawford, supra note 29 at 221-26; Shaw, supra note 29 at 502-7. 
31
  See Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 22, §4.01. 
32
 [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 [Campbell].  For more detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Judicial 
Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence”, in Hamar 
Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the 
Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 129 
[McNeil, “Judicial Approaches”]. 
33
 See Campbell, supra note 32, esp. at paras. 134-38, where Williamson J. also relied on the 
fact that Lamer C.J. had held that Aboriginal title is communal and that Aboriginal nations 
have decision-making authority over their communally-held lands – authority that 
Williamson J. said must be governmental in nature.  For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, 
“The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in McNeil, Emerging 
Justice?, supra note 20 at 102 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”]; McNeil, “Judicial 
Approaches”, supra note 32. 
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practices that the common law then translates into legal rights.
34
  At the same 
time, she disagreed explicitly with the territorial approach that had been taken by 
Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal and Daigle 
J.A. of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal, favouring instead a site-specific 
approach whereby Aboriginal title has to be established by proof of physical 
occupation of specific sites (in this instance, where the Mi’kmaq accused had 
harvested timber). 
In their minority judgment, Justices LeBel and Fish disagreed forcibly with 
McLachlin C.J.’s approach, which they thought relied too heavily on the 
common law and did not take account of Indigenous law and Indigenous 
conceptions of territory.
35
 
I find McLachlin C.J.’s decision puzzling, in part because she concurred with 
Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw and thus seemed to endorse his acceptance of the 
role of Indigenous law in proving occupation, which I have argued is necessarily 
a territorial approach.
36
  She also purported to follow the Delgamuukw decision 
in Marshall/Bernard.  Moreover, in previous judgments she spoke of the 
“golden thread” of continuity of Indigenous law from pre-contact times to the 
present and said that Aboriginal rights that are sourced in Indigenous law 
continue until either surrendered by treaty or extinguished by legislation.
37
 
Unfortunately, Chief Justice McLachlin’s limited, common law approach and 
her reliance on physical occupation have now been applied even more strictly by 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case.  Moreover, 
Justice Groberman, whose judgment was concurred in by Levine and Tysoe 
JJ.A., adopted the site-specific approach used by McLachlin C.J. in 
Marshall/Bernard, even though Justice Vickers at trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation had 
pointed out that an Aboriginal title claim to a territory is different from a claim 
to Aboriginal title to specific sites in the context of a defence to a prosecution, as 
in Marshall/Bernard.
38
 
                                                          
34
 For critical commentary, see “Special Forum: Perspectives on R. v. Marshall; R. v. 
Bernard” (2006) 55 U.N.B.L.J. 73; Slattery, supra note 1 at 279-81. 
35
 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2, esp. at paras. 110, 127-30.  LeBel and Fish JJ. concurred 
in result on the basis of the evidence, but disagreed with the majority on the correct approach 
to proving Aboriginal title. 
36
 For critical discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s 
Happening?” (1996) 69 Sask. L. Rev. 281 [McNeil, “What’s Happening?”]. 
37
 Van der Peet, supra note 18 at paras. 263-67; Mitchell at para. 10, quoted in note 19 supra. 
38
 See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at para. 582 [Tsilhqot’in 
Nation BCSC].  On the inappropriateness of litigating Aboriginal title claims in the context of 
9 
 
Justice Groberman limited Aboriginal title to “definite tract[s] of land the 
boundaries of which are reasonably capable of definition.”39 He regarded 
definite tracts as “specific sites on which hunting, fishing, or resource extraction 
activities took place on a regular and intensive basis”, such as “salt licks, narrow 
defiles between mountains and cliffs, particular rocks or promontories used for 
netting salmon, or, in other areas of the country, buffalo jumps”.40  However, in 
the numbered treaties, where vast areas of land were surrendered, the whole 
treaty area was defined and referred to as a “tract”, revealing that the term 
“definite tract” tells us nothing about the size of the area in question.41  
Moreover, when Lamer C.J. stated in Delgamuukw that physical occupation 
could be established by “regular use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing 
or otherwise exploiting its resources”,42 he did not say that the use had to be 
intensive – that qualification was added by Justice Groberman.43  Instead, Lamer 
C.J. referred to the following passage from my book, Common Law Aboriginal 
Title: 
Definite tracts over which they [the Indigenous people in question] 
herded domestic animals, and lands to which they resorted on a regular 
basis to hunt, fish, or collect the natural products of the earth, should be 
included [in the area occupied by them] as well, particularly if other 
individuals and groups were generally excluded therefrom.  Probably 
even outlying areas that were visited occasionally, and regarded as 
being under their exclusive control, would also be occupied by them in 
                                                                                                                                                               
prosecutions, see Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at paras. 142-44, per LeBel J.; Shin Imai, 
“The Adjudication of Historical Evidence: A Comment and an Elaboration on a Proposal by 
Justice LeBel” (2006) 55 U.N.B.L.J. 146. 
39
 Tsilhqot’in Nation BCCA, supra note 3 at para. 230. 
40
 Ibid. at para. 221. 
41
 E.g. see Treaty 3 (1873), in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians 
(Toronto: Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880), 320 at 322: “The tract comprised within the lines 
above described embracing an area of fifty-five thousand square miles”.  Treaty 8 (1899), 
covering an even larger area, provided that “the said Indians … shall have right to pursue 
their usual vocations of hunting, trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as 
hereinbefore described”: Treaty No. 8, reprinted from the 1899 edition (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1966), 12.  
42
 Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 149. 
43
 McLachlin C.J. did use the word “intensive” in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2, but not as a 
requirement.  She stated at para. 70: “In summary, exclusive possession in the sense of 
intention and capacity to control is required to establish aboriginal title.  Typically, this is 
established by showing regular occupancy or use of definite tracts of land for hunting, fishing 
or exploiting resources: Delgamuukw, at para. 149.  Less intensive uses may give rise to 
different rights.” 
10 
 
much the same way as the waste of a manor would be occupied by the 
lord, though he might seldom go there.
44
  
As we shall see below, the common law standard for occupation that Lamer C.J. 
found to be applicable in this context does not require intensive use, or indeed 
any use at all in some circumstances – rather, what really counts is the intention 
to possess and the exclusion of others. 
My main criticisms of the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision in the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation case are therefore twofold.45  First, even if one accepts (which 
I do not
46
) that Aboriginal title depends exclusively on physical occupation of 
definite tracts of land, the test for occupation applied by the British Columbia 
Court of Appeal is inconsistent with common law authority relating to 
occupation of land and is therefore too strict.
47
  My second criticism is that the 
site-specific, non-territorial approach is simply wrong.  It pays too much 
attention to physical occupation and disregards Indigenous law.  As discussed 
above, this approach is inconsistent with the Delgamuukw decision. 
5.   The Common Law Standard for Occupation 
I examined the common law requirements for occupation of land and related 
them to proof of Aboriginal title in Common Law Aboriginal Title,
48
 and so will 
only summarize the main points here.  The case law reveals that occupation of 
land is a question of fact that depends on all the circumstances.  The nature of 
the land and the uses to which it could reasonably be put at the relevant time 
have to be taken into account.  Lord O’Hagan put it this way in Lord Advocate v. 
Lord Lovat: 
                                                          
44
 McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 202 (footnote omitted). 
45
 For further criticism of the decision by a retired judge of the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal, see Douglas Lambert, “The Tsilhqot’in Case” (2012) 70:6 The Advocate 819. 
46
 In Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6, I presented Indigenous law title (ch. 6) and 
common law title (ch. 7) as alternative approaches.  In Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J. combined 
these two approaches to produce the territorial approach described above.  Thereafter, I 
modified my own views to take into account the jurisdictional aspects of Aboriginal title: see 
McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 33; Kent McNeil, “Self-Government and the 
Inalienability of Aboriginal Title” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473; McNeil, “What’s Happening?”, 
supra note 36.  See also Slattery, supra note 1. 
47
 See also Nicole Petersen, “The Standard of Occupation for Aboriginal Title in William v. 
British Columbia”, April 2013, unpublished research paper. 
48
 Supra note 6 at 196-204. 
11 
 
The character and value of the property, the suitable and natural 
mode of using it, the course of conduct which the proprietor might 
reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his own 
interests – all these things, greatly varying as they must, under 
various conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the 
sufficiency of a possession.
49
 
A large variety of acts can therefore demonstrate occupation, including 
perambulation,
50
 hunting,
51
 fishing,
52
 cutting grass,
53
 and even blazing trees.
54
  In 
one case that went up on appeal from the British Columbia Court of Appeal to 
the Privy Council in London, mere payment of taxes on wild, unimproved land 
was held to be sufficient evidence of occupation to confer title.
55
  In another case 
where the only act of occupation was placing markers at the four corners of the 
land, the Privy Council found that to be sufficient.  Lord Guest observed: 
Their Lordships do not consider that in order to establish 
possession it is necessary for a claimant to take some active step in 
relation to the land such as enclosing the land or cultivating it. The 
type of conduct which indicates possession must vary with the type 
of land.  In the case of vacant and unenclosed land which is not 
being cultivated there is little which can be done on the land to 
indicate possession.
56
 
Moreover, in assessing the acts of occupation, “the conditions of life and habits 
and ideas of the people” living there should be taken into account.57  The 
relevant considerations are therefore social and cultural as well as physical. 
                                                          
49
 (1880), 5 App. Cas. 273 at 288 (H.L.), approved in Johnston v. O’Neill, [1911] A.C. 552 at 
583 (H.L.).  See also the list of cases cited in McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra 
note 6 at 200 n.27.  Note that, while many of the authorities I am relying on are from the 19
th
 
and early 20
th
 centuries, this is appropriate because the time when the Tsilhqot’in have to 
prove their occupation is 1846, the date at which Vickers J. held that the Crown had asserted 
sovereignty over their territory: Tsilhqot’in Nation BCSC, supra note 38 at paras. 601-2. 
50
 Woolway v. Rowe (1834), 1 Ad. & E. 114 (K.B.). 
51
 Red House Farms Ltd. v. Catchpole (1976), 244 E.G. 295 (Engl. C.A.) [Red House Farms]. 
52
 Curzon v. Lomax (1803), 5 Esp. 60 (K.B.); Bristow v. Cormican (1874), Ir. R. 10 C.L. 398 
at 408 (Ex.), aff’d (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641 (H.L.). 
53
 Cadija Umma v. S. Don Manis Appu, [1939] A.C. 136 (P.C.) [Cadija Umma]. 
54
 Halifax Power Co. v. Christie (1915), 48 N.S.R. 264 at 267 (N.S.S.C.) [Halifax Power]. 
55
 Kirby v. Cowderoy, [1912] A.C. 599 at 602-3 [Kirby].  
56
 Wuta-Ofei v. Danquah, [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1238 at 1243 (P.C.) [Wuta-Ofei] (emphasis 
added). 
57
 Cadija Umma (on appeal from Ceylon), supra note 53 at 141-42, per Sir George Rankin. 
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At least as important as physical acts on or in relation to the land is the intention 
to hold and use the land for one’s own purposes and to exclude others who have 
not been given permission to enter.
58
  This is why placing markers or blazing 
trees around the perimeter of the land demonstrate occupation, even if the land is 
not otherwise occupied or used.
59
  In other words, the occupier is not obliged to 
use the land in any particular way, as long as the intention to occupy is present 
and manifest through public acts in relation to the land and no one else is in 
actual occupation.
60
  
In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin C.J. held that, in assessing occupation in order 
to determine whether Aboriginal title has been proven, a court has to decide 
whether the Aboriginal relationship with the land was such that it could be 
translated into title at common law.
61
  Relying on English case law,
62
 she 
affirmed that “[t]he common law recognizes that possession sufficient to ground 
title is a matter of fact, depending on all the circumstances, in particular the 
nature of the land and the manner in which the land is commonly enjoyed”.63 
She noted as well that, “where marshy land is virtually useless except for 
shooting, shooting over it may amount to adverse possession”, and “that a person 
with adequate possession for title may use it intermittently or sporadically”.64  
Citing Delgamuukw, she also said that “the common law recognizes that 
exclusivity does not preclude consensual arrangements that recognize shared 
title to the same parcel of land”.65 
Chief Justice McLachlin emphasized that assessment of the practices relied upon 
to establish title must take into account the Aboriginal perspective: 
The aboriginal perspective grounds the analysis and imbues its every 
step.  It must be considered in evaluating the practice at issue, and a 
                                                          
58
 See Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common 
Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), 28-36; John M. Lightwood, A Treatise on Possession 
of Land (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 1894), 9-27; R.D.C. Stewart, “The Differences 
between Possession of Land and Chattels” (1933) 11 Can. Bar Rev. 651 at 652-56. 
59
 Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56; Halifax Power, supra note 54. 
60
 This explains why payment of taxes on the land was sufficient to establish occupation in 
Kirby, supra note 55. 
61
 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at paras. 48-51, 69-70, 78. 
62
 Powell v. McFarlane (1977), 38 P. & C.R. 452 at 471 (Ch.D.). 
63
 Supra note 2 at para. 54. 
64
 Ibid., citing Red House Farms, supra note 51, and Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), 13 O.R. (2d) 
680 (C.A.), per Wilson J.A. 
65
 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para. 54, citing Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 158. 
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generous approach must be taken in matching it to the appropriate 
modern right.
66
 
For example, she commented as follows on the requirement of exclusivity: 
[T]he people may have been peaceful and have chosen to exercise 
their control by sharing rather than exclusion.  It is therefore critical 
to view the question of exclusion from the aboriginal perspective….  
It follows that evidence of acts of exclusion is not required to 
establish aboriginal title.  All that is required is demonstration of 
effective control of the land by the group, from which a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that it could have excluded others had it 
chosen to do so.
67
 
At common law, effective control can be demonstrated by regular use of the 
land, but does not depend on use of specific sites.  Indeed, the common law 
cases clearly reveal that control of, or even notice of intention to control, the 
perimeter of a tract of land is sufficient to establish occupation of all the land 
within the perimeter.
68
 
Most of the common law cases in which the issue of sufficiency of occupation 
has arisen have involved adverse possession where a wrongdoer claimed to have 
acquired a possessory title by ousting the rightful owner for the statutory 
limitation period.  Aboriginal peoples claiming Aboriginal title are obviously not 
wrongdoers – on the contrary, they are claiming title because they were in 
rightful occupation of their traditional lands at the time of Crown assertion of 
sovereignty.  The standard to be applied in determining whether they had the 
occupation required for title should therefore be considerably lower than that 
required for persons claiming title by adverse possession.
69
 
However, in Tsilhqot’in Nation it is apparent that the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal applied a standard higher even than the standard for adverse possession 
                                                          
66
 Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at para. 50.  See also paras. 45-49, 51, 64, 69-70, 78. 
67
 Ibid. at paras. 64-65. 
68
 Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56; Halifax Power, supra note 54. 
69
 See R. v. Marshall, [2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211, per Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) at paras. 
124-38; McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title, supra note 6 at 197-99.  Even in adverse 
possession cases, judges have been much more willing to accord possession to “innocent” 
persons (i.e. those who honestly and mistakenly occupy someone else’s land) than to 
conscious wrongdoers: see Wood v. Gateway of Uxbridge Properties Ltd. (1990), 75 O.R. 
(2d) 769 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Teis v. Ancaster (Town) (1997), 152 D.L.R. (4
th
) 304 (Ont. C.A.); 
Elliott v. Woodstock Agricultural Society (2008), 298 D.L.R. (4
 th
) 577 at para. 29 (Ont. C.A.). 
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by wrongdoers.  Without referring to a single case involving sufficiency of 
occupation at common law, Groberman J.A. concluded that intensive and regular 
use of definite tracts of land is necessary to establish the occupation required for 
Aboriginal title.  With all due respect, his test is inconsistent with the common 
law standard, approved by McLachlin C.J. in Marshall/Bernard, which we have 
seen is more concerned with intention to control and exclusion of others than 
with specific use of the land, or indeed any use at all.
70
 
Also missing from Groberman J.A.’s analysis is any serious assessment of the 
Aboriginal perspective, which McLachlin C.J. said “grounds the analysis and 
imbues its every step.”71  Judges should therefore be examining the evidence 
carefully to determine what uses and what standard of occupation and exclusion 
are appropriate to the specific Aboriginal society at the time in the geographical 
location in question, taking into account, as Lamer C.J. directed in Delgamuukw 
and McLachlin C.J. affirmed in Marshall/Bernard, “the group’s size, manner of 
life, material resources, and technological abilities, and the character of the lands 
claimed”.72  This approach is also in keeping with the common law, which 
directs that “the conditions of life and habits and ideas of the people” need to be 
taken into account.
73
 
6.   Conclusion: Applying Delgamuukw 
In summary, the main problems I have identified with a strictly common law 
approach to Aboriginal title are that it ignores Indigenous law and does not 
include governmental authority.  As a consequence, it does not take into account 
the significant developments in the jurisprudence in the Delgamuukw and 
Campbell decisions.  Moreover, the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation, while purporting to take a common law approach, in fact 
applied a test for Aboriginal occupation that is much stricter even than the 
common law test for adverse possessors who are known wrongdoers.  The 
                                                          
70
 See especially Kirby, supra note 55, a Privy Council decision on appeal from the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, and Wuta-Ofei, supra note 56.  See also the quotation from 
McLachlin C.J.’s judgment in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 43. 
71
 Marshall/Bernard, supra 2 at para. 55: see text accompanying note 66 supra. 
72
 Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at para. 149, quoting from Brian Slattery, “Understanding 
Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 64 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 758, adopted in Marshall/Bernard, supra 
note 2 at para. 49.  McLachlin C.J. also approved La Forest J.’s statement in Delgamuukw 
that, “when dealing with a claim of ‘aboriginal title’, the court will focus on the occupation 
and use of the land as part of the aboriginal society’s traditional way of life”: Delgamuukw, 
supra note 6 at para. 194 (emphasis in original), quoted in Marshall/Bernard, supra note 2 at 
para. 49. 
73
 Cadija Umma, supra note 53 at 141-42, per Sir George Rankin. 
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standard of occupation applied by the Court of Appeal is therefore 
discriminatory and must be rejected. 
The Indigenous law approach, while acknowledging the existence and 
continuing application of Indigenous law, suffers from serious shortcomings that 
have become glaringly apparent in Australia: (1) in addition to showing a 
connection with the land, Indigenous peoples in Australia have to prove they had 
laws or customs that gave them rights in relation thereto prior to Crown 
acquisition of sovereignty; (2) the content of their land rights is limited to the 
rights under their pre-existing laws and customs; (3) they have no inherent 
governmental authority that would permit them to make new laws or 
significantly change their pre-existing laws; and (4) loss of their connection with 
the land and discontinuance of their laws and customs in relation thereto result in 
loss of their land rights. 
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer adopted the common law approach, but 
went significantly beyond it by incorporating Indigenous law into the test for 
establishing Aboriginal title.  In so doing, he acknowledged the importance and 
relevance of Indigenous law, while avoiding the problems with native title in 
Australia by not relying on Indigenous law to define the content of Aboriginal 
title.  Instead, he maintained that Indigenous law is a source of Aboriginal title 
that can be used to prove the occupation upon which the title depends.  Given 
that a society’s laws in relation to land are generally territorial in their 
application,
74
 Lamer C.J.’s conception of Aboriginal title is necessarily 
territorial.  Moreover, as held by Justice Williamson in the Campbell decision, 
Aboriginal title as conceptualized by Lamer C.J. includes governmental 
authority.  Unlike Aboriginal title under a strictly common law approach, it is 
more than a proprietary interest.  It is also jurisdictional. 
Chief Justice Lamer’s approach to Aboriginal title is an innovative advance in 
the jurisprudence that was concurred in by the current Chief Justice.  It resolves 
the dilemma of having to choose between the common law and Indigenous law 
as the source of Aboriginal title.  At the same time, it can be used to explain the 
distinction between the external and internal aspects of Indigenous title, 
identified by Brian Slattery.
75
  Externally, as against the outside world, 
Aboriginal title is a generic right that, subject to the limit that the lands cannot be 
                                                          
74
 The kinds of laws Lamer C.J. gave as examples – trespass laws, a land tenure system, and 
laws governing land use – tend to be laws of general application that typically would apply 
throughout an Indigenous people’s territory.  See quotations accompanying notes 27 and 28, 
supra. 
75
 Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 1 at 270, 279. 
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used in ways irreconcilable with the connection with the land on which the title 
is based,
76
 does not vary from one title-holding group to another.  Internally, the 
Indigenous law of each group continues to apply to govern landholding within 
their territory.  Moreover, this law is not frozen in time at the moment of Crown 
assertion of sovereignty.  It is dynamic, and can be modified at any time through 
the exercise of the group’s right of internal self-government.77 
We have seen that the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation case deviated substantially from both the common law 
standard for occupation of land and the Delgamuukw decision on the role 
Indigenous law in proving Aboriginal title.  In January, 2013, the Supreme Court 
of Canada granted leave to appeal.  The appeal is scheduled to be heard on 
November 7 of this year.  With all due respect, I think the Supreme Court should 
overturn Justice Groberman’s decision and apply the combined common 
law/Indigenous law approach to proof of Aboriginal title that was firmly 
established by the Court’s own decision in Delgamuukw. 
                                                          
76
 Delgamuukw, supra note 6 at paras. 125-32.  For criticism of this inherent limit on 
Aboriginal title, see McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, supra note 33 at 116-22. 
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 Campbell, supra note 32.  See also Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196 at 212-15; McNeil, “What’s Happening?”, supra note 
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